Process - Automobiles - Nonresident Motorist Statutes - Parties & (and) Venue by Garbarino, Robert P.
Volume 1 Issue 1 Article 11 
1956 
Process - Automobiles - Nonresident Motorist Statutes - Parties & 
(and) Venue 
Robert P. Garbarino 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Transportation Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert P. Garbarino, Process - Automobiles - Nonresident Motorist Statutes - Parties & (and) Venue, 1 Vill. 
L. Rev. 97 (1956). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol1/iss1/11 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
JANUARY 1956]
PROCES S-AUTOMOBILES-NONRESIDENT MOTORIST
STATUTES-PARTIES & VENUE.
I.
With automobile production and highway traffic reaching all time
peaks it is not surprising that the greatest area of litigation today in-
volves suits arising out of automobile accidents. As a consequence of the
tremendous postwar increase in superhighway construction and cross-
country travel, cases involving nonresident parties are on the upturn. Sev-
eral legal problems may arise from such an accident. A typical fact situa-
tion might involve a collision between a resident trucker employed by an
out of state employer and a nonresident motorist while pulling out from a
gas station onto a state highway. The plaintiff may avail himself of the
benefit of the state's nonresident motorist statute providing for substituted
service of process upon nonresidents in cases arising out of the operation
of motor vehicles. Such statutes are found in every state as well as the
District of Columbia.' These statutes have been upheld by the United
States Supreme Court as a reasonable exercise of the state's police power
in protecting its citizens against the use of a dangerous instrumentality on
its highways.2 In spite of this Supreme Court sanction there is a great deal
of contemporary litigation dealing with the construction of these statutes.$
Fundamentally, the problem narrows to one of defining the nature and types
of suits for which this substituted service is available. The immediate
problem is one of defining a "resident" and the meaning of "operate." The
former is typically in issue when members of the armed forces are involved
in the litigation 4 or when a resident motorist becomes a nonresident be-
tween the time of the accident and the service of process.5 The latter prob-
lem is raised when a plaintiff seeks to utilize the substituted service provi-
sion against an out of state owner as a result of a collision with his oper-
ator.6 There also arises the problem of whether service under these stat-
utes is to be extended to contract actions growing out of the operation of
motor vehicles or whether they are limited to tort actions. 7 Joint tort-
1. See Knoop v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832, 836 (N.D. Iowa 1947) for a com-
pilation of all the statutes.
2. Olberding v. Illinois Central R.R., 346 U.S. 338 (1953) ; Hess v. Pawloski,
274 U.S. 352 (1927). Though the "dangerous instrumentality doctrine" satisfied the
jurisdictional phase of due process there still might be a problem of proper notice
to meet the constitutional requirement. The usual notice requirement is that the
means employed be reasonably calculated to insure actual notice under the circum-
stances. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928) ; Castelline v. Goldfine Truck
Rental Service, 112 A.2d 840 (Del. 1955).
3. See 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 702 (1955).
4. Ibid.
5. Ogdon v. Gianakos, 415 Ill. 591, 114 N.E.2d 686 (1953) ; 32 CI-KENT L.
REv. 261 (1954). The Illinois statute provides for substituted service upon resident
motorists who become nonresidents prior to service of process. SMITH-HuRD ANN.
ST. Ch. 95'Y § 23 (Supp. 1954).
6. Larson v. Powell, 117 F. Supp. 239 (1953) ; 30 NoTRE DAME LAW. 324
(1955).
7. See Dart Transit Co. v. Wiggins, 1 Ill. App.2d 126, 117 N.E.2d 314 (1954).
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feasors in multiple party suits usually seek this extension to contract ac-
tions in order to enforce contribution by impleading another party. The
decisions have gone in both directions 8 with a recent New Jersey case 9
holding that'they are restricted to ex delicto actions. As a further problem
of statutory interpretation a court might have to decide whether the statute
extends to accidents occurring on private property. 10 These subjects will
be treated only insofar as they relate to the topic under consideration,
namely, the effect of nonresident motorist statutes upon parties plaintiff in
state and federal courts, particularly when they reside in the same sister
state.
II.
PARTIES PLAINTIFF.
Since the return of the automobile industry to full time production
the cases indicate that there is increased litigation involving this particular
phase of the problem. Defendants have contended that the motorist acts
were intended to protect only resident plaintiffs." However, these attacks
have been fruitless, even in the face of actions involving alien plaintiffs.' 2
That the law is settled in this respect is evidenced by the consistent inter-
pretation of these statutes as encompassing actions by nonresident plain-
tiffs. 13 The courts have flatly stated that the legislatures are as interested
in protecting the rights of nonresidents as they are of residents, and that
if they were of a mind to discriminate they would so express themselves. 14
Though statutes expressly including nonresidents 15 have been enacted,
the majority of jurisdictions achieve this result by decision.
There are but two variations on this otherwise consistent holding.
They find their roots in a few older decisions of the States of New York 16
and Pennsylvania. 1'7 But these controversies appear to have been resolved
recently, and we now find these jurisdictions aligning themselves with the
8. Compare Whalen v. Young, 15 N.J. 321, 104 A.2d 678 (1954); wvith Dart
Transit Co. v. Wiggins, 1 Ill. App.2d 126, 117 N.E.2d 314 (1954).
9. Whalen v. Young, 15 N.J. 321, 104 A.2d 678 (1954).
10. See 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 702 (1955)
11. See, e.g., Greene v. Goodyear, 112 F. Supp. 27 (M.D. Pa. 1953) ; Karagiannis
v. Shaffer, 96 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Pa. 1951); Ruggles v. Smith, 175 Kan. 76,
259 P.2d 199 (1953) ; White v. White, 147 Me. 63, 83 A.2d 296 (1951) ; Burns v.
Godwin, 211 Miss. 310, 51 So.2d 486 (1951) ; Thomas v. Altsheler, 191 Tenn. 640,
235 S.W.2d 806 (1951).
12. Garcia v. Frausto, 97 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Mo. 1951) ; Gianetto v. La Delpha,
278 App. Div. 179, 104 N.Y.S.2d 362 (4th Dep't), appeal denied, 278 App. Div.
1022, 105 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (4th Dep't 1951).
13. See, e.g., Peeples v. Ramspacher, 29 F. Supp. 632 (E.D.S.C. 1939) ; Fine
v. Wencke, 117 Conn. 683, 169 Atl. 58 (1933) ; Welsh v. Ruopp, 228 Iowa 70, 289
N.W. 760 (1940).
14. Garon v. Poirier, 86 N.H. 174, 164 Atl. 765 (1933).
15. See Culp, Recent Developments in Actions Against Non-resident Motorists,
37 MicH. L. REv. 58, 74 (1938).
16. Gainer v. Donner, 140 Misc. 841, 254 N.Y. Supp. 635 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
17. Haddonleigh Estates, Inc. v. Spector Motor Service, Inc., 41 Pa. D. & C.
246 (C.P., Bucks 1941).
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overwhelming weight of authority.' 8 The dispute in Pennsylvania arose
when Judge Boyer of the Common Pleas Court of Bucks County ruled,
on the basis of a prior unrecorded decision of the same jurisdiction, that
the Pennsylvania statute excluded nonresident plaintiffs. 19  In a subse-
quent federal district court decision, Judge Bard felt obligated on the basis
of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins 20 to accept this as the substantive law of the
state, and he followed its precedent. 21  However, the contrary result was
achieved in the next federal decision, 22 the court holding that the unrecorded
Bucks County ruling was nothing more than dictum. Recognizing an in-
tent from the notes of the state procedural rules committee to include non-
resident plaintiffs, Judge Gibson in the case of Neff v. Hindman 23 brought
Pennsylvania squarely within the established rule. That decision has since
been followed in both the state and federal district courts of Pennsylvania.
24
Furthermore, there was a Pennsylvania decision upholding the majority
view even prior to the second federal ruling.2
5
In an early New York Supreme Court decision the court refused to
entertain such a suit between two nonresidents. 26 It is noteworthy that
the court expressly pointed to the fact that this action involved fellow resi-
dents of a jurisdiction which was located about a mile from the locus of
the accident in New York, and, hence, a very convenient mode of bring-
ing suit. Subsequent New York decisions have been unanimous in hold-
ing that the doors of their tribunals are open to nonresident plaintiffs.
2 7
Subsequently in a 1933 per curiam decision, the New York Appellate Divi-
sion held that this is not a matter of discretion, but, rather, a matter of
right.2
8
18. Lambert v. Doyle, 70 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. Pa. 1947) ; Gianetto v. La Delpha,
278 App. Div. 179, 104 N.Y.S.2d 362 (4th Dep't), appeal denied, 278 App. Div.
1022, 105 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (4th Dep't 1951).
19. Haddonleigh Estates, Inc. v. Spector Motor Service, Inc., 41 Pa. D. & C.
246, 247 (C.P., Bucks 1941), citing, Pekins v. Great Eastern System, Inc., No.
17, C.P. Pa. (Bucks), January Term, 1937. The same result was reached in New
Jersey under a statute which, read prior to amendment, "by any resident of New
Jersey," Charles v. Fischer Baking Co., 117 N.J.L. 115, 187 Atl. 175 (Err. & App.
1936).
20. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
21. Lambert v. Doyle, 70 F. Supp. 990 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
22. Neff v. Hindman, 77 F. Supp. 4 (W.D. Pa. 1948).
23. Ibid.
24. Greene v. Goodyear, 112 F. Supp. 27 (M.D. Pa. 1953) ; Karagiannis v.
Shaffer, 96 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Pa. 1951); Webb v. Link, 70 Pa. D. & C. 51
(C.P. Erie 1949).
25. John v. Parks, 63 Pa. D. & C. 375 (C.P. Fay. 1947).
26. Gainer v. Donner, 140 Misc. 841, 254 N.Y. Supp. 635 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
27. Gianetto v. La Delpha, 278 App. Div. 179, 104 N.Y.S.2d 362 (4th Dep't),
appeal denied, 278 App. Div. 1022, 105 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (4th Dep't 1951) ; Malak
v. Upton, 166 Misc. 817, 3 N.Y.S.2d 248 (Sup. Ct. 1938) ; Hunter v. Hosmer, 142
Misc. 382, 254 N.Y. Supp. 635 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
28. Sobeck v. Koellmer, 240 App. Div. 736, 265 N.Y. Supp. 778 (2d Dep't
1933).
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III.
ACTIONS BETWEEN NONRESIDENTS OF THE SAME STATE.
Among the decisions one would expect to find some expression of an
alternate proposal in order to circumvent the obvious impropriety of the
rule when the action involves co-residents of the same foreign jurisdiction.
But the single Montana suggestion 29 by Chief Justice Johnson stands alone.
While intimating that an amendment might be in order under such cir-
cumstances, the Chief Justice said:
"It seems clear to us that the object of the act is to further the
safety of highway traffic within the state and afford a practicable
remedy for damages arising from negligence on the highways, by pro-
viding for service of summons within the state where it would other-
wise be impossible, or virtually so. The act cannot be construed
liberally to effect that object by limiting its application to plaintiffs
resident in Montana, and in [sic] absence of a direct provision in the
act to that effect, we cannot impute an intent to discriminate in favor
of resident plaintiffs and against nonresident plaintiffs. Ordinarily
the better place for suit is where the accident occurred and where
usually the evidence, physical and otherwise, will be available. If the
plaintiffs had been residents of North Dakota, there would be no more
reason why they should be compelled to go to Washington to sue than
if they have been residents of Montana. There might be some reason
where, as here, both plaintiffs and defendants were residents of Wash-
ington, but if so that is a matter of policy for the legislature to decide.
In any event it seems clear from this analysis that the real question of
policy arising from the circumstances of these cases is not that the
plaintiffs are nonresidents of Montana, but rather that they happen to
be residents of the same state as the defendants; and even assuming
that the court might read into the statute an intention to protect only
residents as distinguished from nonresidents, it is obviously not pos-
sible to read into it an intent to protect all but residents of the same
state as the defendants, or all but residents living closer to the defend-
ants than to Montana." (Emphasis added.) s0
In the light of present day statutes 31 it is apparent that the legislatures
have not deemed this change worthy of consideration.
Since the basic rule appears to be firmly entrenched it might be well
to analyze the usual rationale in upholding it, and then offer some reasons
for amendment in the case of parties residing in the same foreign state.
Foremost among the reasons for upholding the rule is that of convenience
29. State ex rel. Gallagher v. District Court, 112 Mont. 253, 114 P.2d 1047, 1053
(1941).
30. Ibid.
31. Knoop v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Iowa 1947).
[VOL. 1.
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in accumulating the witnesses and evidence. 32  Second, that the case should
be heard in a court familiar with the law of the locus of the accident since
its substantive law will prevail.38  Third, the Connecticut 34 and Dela-
ware 35 courts have expressed a fear that a refusal to entertain a suit by
nonresident plaintiffs might raise a question of discrimination forbidden
by the privileges and immunities clause of article IV of the Constitution. 6
However, this clause has never been clearly defined and a thorough look
at the few privileges which the Supreme Court has asserted over the years
as belonging to state citizenship 3 makes it apparent that these privileges
are quite limited. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has frequently stated
that article IV does not forbid reasonable discrimination.3 8  On the other
hand, we find three fundamental propositions in support of modification
of the rule. Certainly there is substance to the contention that the wit-
nesses and evidence will be more accessible in the state of the locus of the
accident. But this argument loses a great deal of its vitality when it faces
the situation where both parties are residents of the same foreign state.
Very often the witnesses are passengers in the respective autos and they
too are nonresidents. It is in this area of the subject that revision is
needed. Clearly there is a patent inconvenience in parties residing in iden-
tical jurisdictions going to a foreign sovereignty to have their cause heard.
The thought of two Massachusetts residents traveling to North Carolina 39
as opposing parties would appear to add great weight to the Montana
dictum of Chief Justice Johnson. But the decisions involving identical
factual situations consistently adhere to the usual rule.4 0  Second, there is
the state's interest in easing the strain on already overcrowded court dock-
ets.4 1 We find Mr. Justice Holmes speaking strongly in Douglas v. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R.42 in opposition to the imposition of additional litiga-
32. See, e.g., Hoagland v. Dolan, 259 Ky. 1, 10, 81 S.W.2d 869, 873 (1935) ; Burns
v. Godwin, 211 Miss. 310, 51 So. 2d 486, 487 (1951) ; State ex rel. Rush v. Circuit
Court, 209 Wis. 246, 244 N.W. 766, 767 (1932).
33. See, e.g., Peeples v. Ramnspacher, 29 F. Supp. 632, 635 (E.D.S.C. 1939);
Hoagland v. Dolan, 259 Ky. 1, 10, 81 S.W.2d 869, 873 (1935) ; Garon v. Poirier,
86 N.H. 174, 175, 164 At. 765 (1933) ; Sobeck v. Koellmer, 240 App. Div. 736,
265 N.Y. Supp. 778, 779 (2d Dep't 1933).
34. Fine v. Wencke, 117 Conn. 683, 684, 169 At. 58 (1933).
35. Beach v. D. W. Perdue Co., 35 Del. (5 Harr.) 285, 288, 163 At!. 265, 266
(Super. Ct. 1932).
36. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
37. La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919) ; Corfield v. Coryell, 6
Fed. Cas. 546, No. 3230 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823), cited favorably in the Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 394 (1873).
38. E.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); Canadian Northern Ry.
v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553 (1920).
39. See Alberts v. Alberts, 217 N.C. 443, 8 S.E.2d 523 (1940).
40. E.g., Burns v. Godwin, 211 Miss. 310, 51 So. 2d 486 (1951) ; State ex rel.
Rush v. Circuit Court, 209 Wis. 246, 244 N.W. 766 (1932).
41. Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377, 387 (1929).
42. Ibid.
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tion on crowded state tribunals. In this day of procedural reform such
reasoning should carry weight with the legislatures. Third, the allied
notion that residents ultimately bear the costs of operating the courts.4
On the basis of this analysis, it would be desirable for the legislatures to
expressly exclude litigants residing in the same sovereignty from the ambit
of these acts. This would add virtue to the convenience doctrine so often
asserted in favor of allowing nonresident plaintiffs to utilize the benefits of
these statutes. As to the question of constitutional conflict, prior analogous
decisions would indicate that such a proposal would be within constitutional
limits. Despite the absence of square holdings rising above the level of
state appellate rulings, older statutes in New Jersey, 44 Florida, 45 and Ten-
nessee 46 excluding actions by nonresidents, were upheld on the oft-used
distinction between citizenship and residence. 47  Supreme Court rulings
on this same distinction 48 would indicate that these state decisions were
proper.
The ultimate effect of these decisions would indicate a trend toward a
further liberalization of the doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff 49 protecting non-
residents from constructive service of process in suits in personam. Cer-
tainly the volume of contemporary motor travel as well as the ease with
which state lines may be crossed dictates a need for some liberalization of a
rule set down in 1878. A further extension of the rule has led to the
problem of implied waiver of venue in the federal courts.50
IV.
VENUE.
The 1953 decision in the case of Olberding v. Illinois Central R.R. 51
finally ended the serious conflict which had arisen .in the lower federal
courts over the waiver of the federal venue privilege through the use of
the highways of a state having a nonresident motorist statute. The problem
arose as a result of the wording of § 1391 (a) of the United States Code
which reads, "A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on
43. Ibid.
44. See Charles v. Fischer Baking Co., 14 N.J. Misc. 18, 182 Atl. 30 (Sup.
Ct. 1935), aff'd, 117 N.J.L. 115, 187 Atl. 175 (Err. & App. 1936).
45. See Culp, Recent Developments in Actions Against Non-resident Motorists,
37 MicH. L. REv. 58, 75 (1938).
46. Ibid.
47. State ex rel. Cochran v. Lewis, 118 Fla. 536, 159 So. 792 (1935); Charles
v. Fischer Baking Co., 14 N.J. Misc. 18, 182 Atl. 30 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd, 117
N.J.L. 115, 187 Atl. 175 (Err. & App. 1936).
48. Canadian Northern Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553 (1920); La Tourette v.
McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919).
49. 95 U.S. 565 (1878).
50. See, e.g., Urso v. Scales, 90 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. Pa. 1950) ; Krueger v. Hider,
48 F. Supp. 708 (E.D.S.C. 1943).
51. 346 U.S. 338 (1953).
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diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be
brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants
reside." 52 The majority of the lower federal courts had ruled that the
motorist impliedly consented to the waiver of venue by using the highways
by drawing an analogy to those cases holding that a corporation waived
its federal venue privilege by designating a state officer to receive personal
service of process.- a The Supreme Court has clearly stated in the past
that the venue privileges are not constitutional rights but rather privileges
for the convenience of the parties which may be waived. 54 However, the
doctrine of waiver by implied consent was rejected quite emphatically by the
highest court. In refusing to carry over the corporate analogy Justice
Frankfurter said:
"But to conclude from this holding (Hess v. Pawloski, uphold-
ing the constitutionality of nonresident motorist statutes) that the
motorist, who never consented to anything and whose consent is al-
together immaterial, has actually agreed to be sued and has thus
waived his federal venue rights is surely to move in the world of Alice
in Wonderland." 55
In taking this realistic view the court pointed out that the facts differ
from the corporate situation in which there is an express appointment of
an agent upon whom process could be served. The court pointed out that
this doctrine could be applied to an individual as a condition to carrying on
activities within a state. Such an express appointment was constitutionally
upheld under the original New Jersey motorist statute.56
The Olberding case received a great deal of comment by legal writers 57
with a majority proposing a legislative formula similar to the recent amend-
ment to the venue statute as applied to corporations. The amendment
provides that:
"A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is
incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such
judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation
for venue purposes." 58
Hence, the Olberding problem is nonexistent insofar as the corporate
situation is concerned. This distinction has been citicized by some legal
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1952).
53. See 28 So. CALIF. L. REV. 196 (1955).
54. See Olberding v. Illinois Central R.R., 346 U.S. 338 (1953).
55. Id. at 341.
56. Id. at 342.
57. 39 CORNELL L.Q. 334 (1954) ; 22 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 616 (1954) ; 28
So. CALIF. L. REV. 196 (1955); 23 U. CIN. L. REV. 128 (1954); 15 U. Pir. L.
REV. 650 (1954).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1952).
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writers 19 and the dissent in the Olberding case on the grounds that un-
certainty in the law has been created by having a different procedural rule
for corporations. However, it is extremely common to find the corporate
rules of law differing from those applicable to individuals in both form and
substance. Furthermore, the plaintiff may still have the case heard in a
neutral jurisdiction, either in the state courts, or in the federal court in the
district in which the action is pending. In addition, in the case of defective
venue, the district court can transfer the suit to the residence of one of the
parties.6°  Consequently, the venue privilege is preserved without im-
pairing the legislative aim in enacting the nonresident motorist statutes.
V.
CONCLUSION.
With reference to the state courts, the constitutionality of these non-
resident motorist statutes has been clearly asserted. That such statutes
are essential is beyond question. The question of the availability of these
statutes to nonresident plaintiffs even when all the parties to the action
reside in the same state is also settled. A state court facing the problem
as a matter of first impression could follow the uniform rule that the benefits
of these statutes are to be extended to nonresident plaintiffs with the
assurance that the same result has been achieved in the twenty-one juris-
dictions in which the problem has arisen. 61 On a federal level the problem
of venue is at least settled. Hence, a serious procedural uncertainty has
been removed. Congress now has an opportunity to observe its effect.
It can then determine whether an amendment similar to that adopted for
corporate venue purposes is to be extended to individuals or whether the
status quo is to be maintained.
Robert P. Garbarino
59. 22 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 616 (1954).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1952).
61. Greene v. Goodyear, 112 F. Supp. 27 (M.D. Pa. 1953); Garcia v. Frausto,
97 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Mg. 1951) ; Peeples v. Ramspacher, 29 F. Supp. 632 (E.D.S.C.
1939) ; Highway Steel & Mfg. Co. v. Kincannon, 198 Ark. 134, 127 S.W.2d 816,
appeal dismissed without opinion, 308 U.S. 504 (1939) ; Fine v. Wencke, 117 Conn.
683, 169 Atl. 58 (1933) ; Beach v. D. W. Perdue Co., 35 Del. (5 Harr.) 285, 163
Atl. 265 (Super. Ct. 1932); Dart Transit Co. v. Wiggins, 1 11. App.2d 126, 117
N.E.2d 314 (1954); Welsh v. Ruopp, 228 Iowa 70, 289 N.W. 760 (1940) ; Ruggles
v. Smith, 175 Kan. 76, 259 P.2d 199 (1953) ; Hoagland v. Dolan, 259 Ky. 1, 81
S.W.2d 869 (1935) ; White v. White, 147 Me. 63, 83 A.2d 296 (1951) ; Burns v.
Godwin, 211 Miss. 310, 51 So. 2d 486 (1951); State ex rel. Gallagher v. District
Court, 112 Mont. 253, 114 P.2d 1047 (1941); Herzoff v. Hommel, 120 Neb. 475,
233 N.W. 458 (1930) ; Garon v. Poirier, 86 N.H. 174, 164 Ati. 765 (1933);
Gender v. Rayburn, 15 N.J. Misc. 704, 194 Atl. 441 (Cir. Ct.), aff'd, 119 N.J.L.
243, 195 Atd. 513 (Err. & App. 1937) ; Malak v. Upton, 166 Misc. 817, 3 N.Y.S.2d
248 (Sup. Ct. 1938) ; Alberts v. Alberts, 217 N.C. 443, 8 S.E.2d 523 (1940);
Weissenberger v. Freeman, 6 Ohio Supp. 185 (C.P. 1941) ; Thomas v. Altsheler,
191 Tenn. 640, 235 S.W.2d 806 (1951) ; State ex rel. Rush v. Circuit Court, 209
Wis. 246, 244 N.W. 766 (1932).
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